Ticonderoga 1758: Montcalm's victory against all odds (Campaign)

This book is thought-provoking and interesting. It should be read several times in order to catch the subtle observations of the author. Since strengths and weaknesses of both sides are presented in an even-handed manner, this book will be the topic of pointed conversation around campfires at F&I War reenactments for years to come.

Reenactors will want to add this book to their personal libraries, but others may also find it an extremely enjoyable read.

(Tourists to Ticonderoga/Lake George/Lake Champlain, as well as locals, will want this book, as it will provide a quick understanding which goes deeper than a brochure yet isn't cumbersome)


An Excellent Account From the French Perspective   December 1, 2000
 13 out of 15 found this review helpful

Rene Chartrand, a senior curator with Canada's National Historic Sites, has written a ground-breaking account of the climatic British attack on Fort Ticonderoga (then called Carillon by the French) in July 1758. Unlike most of the Osprey Campaign Series which merely summarize well-known battles, Chartrand has written a well-researched account that adds considerable detail, particularly from the French perspective.

The standard recounting of the strategic situation leading to the campaign, the opposing plans and opposing leaders are succinct but adequate. The section on the opposing armies is quite good, including a very detailed order of battle for both sides. Perhaps the only slight here is in the lack of discussion of opposing tactical methods.

Where this volume begins to add value to the study of this campaign is in the skirmish at Bernetz Brook on 6 July. Most accounts focus on the untimely death of the British second-in-command, Brigadier General Howe, in this engagement and the effect his death had on the British army. Chartrand goes much further and clearly shows how the British bumped into an errant French scouting detachment in the forrest below Ticonderoga and annihilated it. Over 300 French troops were killed or captured. Prior to this, Chartrand also shows how ineffective Montcalm's effort to block British progress up Lake George was; the British easily bypassed French patrols on the shoreline by unexpected water movements at night. Instead the British were able to advance all the way up Lake George in two days and the French effort to delay or even monitor them was a failure.

Chartrand also provides a good deal of information on how the British reconnaissance of the defenses of Ticonderoga failed. Most accounts mention the perfunctory survey by the young engineer Lieutenant Clerk, but they fail to mention the probe by Lieutenant Colonel Bradsheet and another engineer officer. Chartrand points out that Clerk was deceived by the effective camouflage of the French defensive line while Bradsheet mistakenly reported the French picket line as the main line of resistance. British overconfidence bred the false assumption that the French defense was fragile and that a hasty frontal assault would succeed.

However the British frontal assault was a costly disaster; in six hours the British suffered about 2,500 casualties in a series of disjointed attacks. Again, most accounts tend to blame the French use of abatis or fallen trees as an obstacle as the main cause of the failure. Chartrand clearly shows how the impetuousness of one of the British brigade commanders who began an unauthorized unsupported attack led to a chain reaction of other British units joining the fray. One unit after another attacked, and was smashed in the French killing field below their defenses. British reconnaissance and security in the battle was abysmal despite the presence of Roger's Rangers; French militia harassed their flanks in the woods and the British never realized how weak the French right flank was. Chartrand also provides useful information on French casualties, it is interesting that the French suffered 106 men killed even though they were well dug-in and few British troops came close to their lines. The role of American colonial units in the battle is also well-covered.

Contrast this 94-page volume with the over-rated 800+ page Crucible of War by Fred Anderson. In that book, the Battle of Ticonderoga merited only eight pages and Anderson omitted key details of the battle while almost completely ignoring the French side.If you are interested in one of the more interesting battles of the French and Indian War, this volume is a golden nugget of useful and often overlooked information.