When Things Fell Apart: State Failure in Late-Century Africa (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics) | 
| Author: Robert H. Bates
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Category: Book
List Price: $19.99
Buy New: $15.00
You Save: $4.99 (25%)
New (5) Used (3) from $14.99
Avg. Customer Rating:  1 reviews
Sales Rank: 76492
Media: Paperback
Edition: 1
Number Of Items: 1
Pages: 216
Shipping Weight (lbs): 0.6
Dimensions (in): 8.3 x 5.5 x 0.6
ISBN: 0521715253
Dewey Decimal Number: 321.09
EAN: 9780521715256
ASIN: 0521715253
Publication Date: February 18, 2008
Availability: Usually ships in 1-2 business days
|
| Also Available In:
|
| Similar Items:
|
| Editorial Reviews:
Product Description
In the later decades of the 20th century, Africa plunged into political chaos. States failed, governments became predators, and citizens took up arms. In When Things Fell Apart, Robert H. Bates advances an explanation of state failure in Africa. In so doing, he not only plumbs the depths of the continent's late-century tragedy, but also the logic of political order and the foundations of the state. This book covers a wide range of territory by drawing on materials from Rwanda, Sudan, Liberia, and Congo. Written to be accessible to the general reader, it is nonetheless a must-read for scholars and policy makers concerned with political conflict and state failure.
Book Description
In When Things Fell Apart, Robert H. Bates addresses the origins of state failure in Africa in the late decades of the twentieth century. Bates plumbs the depths of the continent's late-century tragedy, the logic of political order, and the foundations of the state for explanations for these tragedies.
|
| Customer Reviews:
an interesting model with a hodgepodge of evidence August 25, 2008
1 out of 1 found this review helpful
In this short book (174 pages of text; 139 if you skip the quantitative appendix), Bates argues that state failure stems from predation on the part of the central government. His model, to put it briefly (and inadequately), is that governments can either take revenues from the people (1) in the form of taxes while providing services (such as security) or (2) in the form of predation. As long as the benefits of the former outweigh the latter (for example, when a government is assured of staying in power for a long time), the government will maintain security. However, if the long run is less certain, the government may sacrifice steady long-term gains in favor of larger short-term gains from predation.
Bates starts with an extended, insightful exposition of this metaphor (Chapter Two). Then he characterizes the conditions that prevailed prior to collapse in many African countries in chapters three (political trends), four (bad economic policies), and five (tensions between groups in the countries). In Chapter Six he describes the state failures. The conclusion sums it up, and the appendix gives some statistical evidence (the rest of the evidence is anecdotal or - Bates's preferred term - narrative).
Overall I found the book slow reading (despite its brevity) and not as coherent as I'd have liked. The basic model is useful but I often found it unclear in the succeeding chapters how the many pieces of narrative evidence fit into the model. The clearest example of this was in Chapter Five, where three models of subnational tensions were presented followed by several examples that did not clearly fit the models.
Further, the form of narrative evidence (lots of different examples from various countries) felt less effective to me than either a detailed case study of one example or systematic statistical evidence. (If I had pre-existing intimate familiarity with the national histories, this would have been less of an issue) The statistical annex provides the latter but deserved more space: some integration of statistical findings with narrative evidence might have worked better. (As it was, the statistical annex left me with a number of clarifying questions.) Bates argues that he distinguishes himself from other work in the area by deriving his hypothesis from a theory rather than highlighting empirical "findings" (p8-9).* And yet Bates - in his empirical appendix - reports atheoretical findings such as the increasing likelihood of disorder over time (despite controlling for changes that should drive the changing likelihood) - p171-173. Finally, Bates doesn't devote any time to states that didn't experience state failure and why or how they differed, nor to rival theories and how they fare in light of the national narratives.
As a novice considering whether to read a book like this, the ideal would be to read at least two reviews: one from an expert (who can opine as to how this fits - or doesn't - with existing knowledge) and one from a novice (who can tell how this may read to another novice). I fall in the latter category. In the former, Chris Blattman (an economics professor in Yale's political science department) blogged, "It's short, it's readable, and it's intelligent. Normally if I get just two of the three, I'm thrilled" [1]. A political scientist I know called it an "excellent primer." And Nicholas Van De Walle (author of the highly esteemed African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999) wrote a brief review for Foreign Affairs, summarizing and concluding that "Bates paints in broad brushes and ignores the states in the region, such as Botswana, Cape Verde, and Mauritius, that have not followed this script but actually enjoyed stability, economic growth, and reasonably democratic politics" [2].
Perhaps this volume is most readable to the already initiated. But it is short and imparts a significant amount of valuable information; I recommend Chapters 2 and 6.
[1] Chris Blattman's blog [easily searchable on-line], "When things fell apart," 19 July 2008.
[2] Nicholas Van De Walle, "Africa," Foreign Affairs, May/June 2008.
* I assume by this he means an explicit, chapter-long theory. Other work I've read in this area, by Collier or by Miguel, clearly has a theoretical basis even if not as formally stated as Bates's.
|
|
|
