The Homevoter Hypothesis: How Home Values Influence Local Government Taxation, School Finance, and Land-Use Policies | 
| Author: William A. Fischel
Publisher: Harvard University Press
Category: Book
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Sales Rank: 39328
Media: Paperback
Number Of Items: 1
Pages: 344
Shipping Weight (lbs): 1.1
Dimensions (in): 8.3 x 5.8 x 0.9
ISBN: 0674015959
Dewey Decimal Number: 338.973
EAN: 9780674015951
ASIN: 0674015959
Publication Date: February 15, 2005
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Product Description
Just as investors want the companies they hold equity in to do well, homeowners have a financial interest in the success of their communities. If neighborhood schools are good, if property taxes and crime rates are low, then the value of the homeowner's principal asset--his home--will rise. Thus, as William Fischel shows, homeowners become watchful citizens of local government, not merely to improve their quality of life, but also to counteract the risk to their largest asset, a risk that cannot be diversified. Meanwhile, their vigilance promotes a municipal governance that provides services more efficiently than do the state or national government. Fischel has coined the portmanteau word "homevoter" to crystallize the connection between homeownership and political involvement. The link neatly explains several vexing puzzles, such as why displacement of local taxation by state funds reduces school quality and why local governments are more likely to be efficient providers of environmental amenities. The Homevoter Hypothesis thereby makes a strong case for decentralization of the fiscal and regulatory functions of government. (20011227)
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| Customer Reviews:
 Good supplemental text on local government and zoning January 6, 2007
This makes a great required second book in a local government/administration course. As a matter of fact, it should be required reading for city councilmen all over America.
Fischel does a good job of proving the "people vote with their feet" hypothesis, but more importantly, he ties property values to virtually every local government action (and inaction). Virtually everything that city government does is capitalized into property values -- sometimes with negative effects and sometimes with positive effects. Americans are extremely mobile, moving every 4 years, so we really do vote with our feet to a greater extent than most city governments care to accept.
 "I've Got Mine, Jack!" January 3, 2002
12 out of 15 found this review helpful
There are scads of good books on state and Federal government, but few on local government. William Fischel's The Homevoter Hypothesis is an exception and is an apparent classic on local government. Fischel's book advances more than an "hypothesis." It is a "correlation" that convincingly describes from case studies and case law how real estate economics drives local government. Fischel reports that housing equity in the U.S. is eleven times as large as liquid assets among all homeowners. Home equity value is the largest asset of private wealth. But this equity value is constantly under threat from external forces ("externalities") beyond the control of property owners except by government intervention. Homes are an immovable asset whose value can't be insured against a wipeout of equity. Homeowners will consent to the impositions of municipal and school district financing, zoning, growth controls, and environmental regulations only to the extent that they protect home values, or can be "capitalized" (converted) into higher property values. Fischel advances what he calls the "Tiebout Hypothesis" (from Charles Tiebout) that "people vote with their feet" by moving or shopping for a locality to maximize their wealth. Actually, because real estate is an immobile asset, Fischel's theorem might be more accurately restated as "people put their feet to the vote" or "stake their home value to the vote."
Fischel sometimes uses elegant terms ("homevoter," "unlovely land uses"), classical phrases ("people who buy houses are more careful about it than almost any other transaction, save perhaps getting married"), and even employs a reverse golden rule of sorts ("municipalities will foist disamenities on their neighbor that they would not do unto themselves"). Sometimes Fischel uses blunt summarization such as when he writes that the "Smart Growth Movement" and growth controls "seem to act more like a cartel for those already in possession of suburban homes than as a rationalizer of metropolitan development patterns." Fischel includes helpful subheadings in each chapter, reminiscent of Machiavelli's classic The Prince, that succinctly tell you what he is driving at. Unlike most economics texts, there are no obfuscating "supply and demand" tables in this book.
My only disappointment with the book is that Fischel did not go far enough. For instance, what just compensation is to be provided to landowners whose property has been downzoned for environmental preservation by local government, then acquired by a state or federal agency, or a non-government organization (NGO), for the same preservation use for which it was downzoned? When local government downzones a property to buy it on the cheap it is typically considered a confiscatory taking. What is the difference when two levels of government act in concert to accomplish the same thing, both in response to the same incumbent home voting constituency? Moreover, such interference with real estate markets often results in a situation where there no longer is available any land sales market data from which to determine the value of a property, except government and non-government organization sales that can not be considered under government real estate appraisal standards (see reviewer's "Valuing Nature Land in 'Extinct' Markets," Appraisal Journal, 1998). Another example would be toxic waste site cleanup policies that are less concerned with the "health effects" than "wealth effects" to surrounding property values (see reviewer's "But is it Market Value?" Appraisal Journal, 1999 and "The Externality Principle: Value Transfers from Toxic Waste Site Cleanups as a Basis for Regulatory Takings," Environmental Claims Journal, 2001). How can "people vote with their feet" when growth controls are meant to put one's feet in cement so to speak? Perhaps Fischel will follow up with a sequel that can address such dilemmas in greater depth? The Homevoter Hypothesis is an indispensable book for city managers, local politicians, zoning and school boards, and the legal and real estate professions. I give it an unqualified highest rating.
Wayne Lusvardi
The opinions expressed above are solely those of the reviewer.
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