Elements of military art and science: or. Course of instruction in strategy, fortification, tactics of battles, &c., embracing the duties of staff, infantry, ... to the use of volunteers and militin. | 
| Author: Michigan Historical Reprint Series
Publisher: Scholarly Publishing Office, University of Michigan Library
Category: Book
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Sales Rank: 1545912
Media: Paperback
Number Of Items: 1
Pages: 480
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Dimensions (in): 9 x 6.1 x 1
ISBN: 1425553265
Dewey Decimal Number: 355
EAN: 9781425553265
ASIN: 1425553265
Publication Date: December 21, 2005
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Product Description
This volume is produced from digital images created through the University of Michigan University Library's preservation reformatting program.
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Textbook on War February 18, 2006
3 out of 3 found this review helpful
This is Gen. H. W. Halleck's instructional textbook on the art and science of war -- used in military institutions in the Nineteenth Century including West Point. Don't be alarmed about the cover title -- the misspellings were due to a mis-scan of the title page. I've alerted the Univ. of Michigan to the problem.
Halleck (1815-1872) was a lawyer, publisher, businessman -- and soldier. He was sometimes called "Old Brains" for his scholarly pursuits. See the www.Wikipedia.org article to get more information on Halleck.
I was looking for a book that went beyond "maxims" and sayings of famous commanders -- and this was it. It thoroughly covers all the aspects of waging war in an introductory level. It covers the reasons for waging war, strategy (on a grand and operational level), tactics, logistics, fortifications, infantry, artillery, engineers. Everything is here for training would-be commanders of war. Again, it's the introductory course on war, so the author doesn't get into any detailed "prescriptive" analysis of any of these topics. Other courses would have taken the student into the detailed aspects of each trade.
Halleck doesn't hesitate to vent his spleen against a sluggish government that wouldn't fortify its coasts and keep a standing professional cadre on hand -- he goes to great length to describe what existed in his day and what ought to be done. The book is terribly dated for that reason; we don't rely on coastal fortifications any more. It may not be necessary for us to read whole chapters on the details of the problem in Halleck's day. But the idea is still sound: we don't need brick and mortar forts to protect us now (except in Arizona!), but we do need flying "super-fortresses" doing the same job against incoming invaders. That's an aspect of war that makes books like Halleck's old textbook so valuable -- there are ideas in the art and science of war that never change, though the technology will.
For this reason, Halleck's book would be a better read for the initiate than the current Army Field Manuals just to get an overall sense of the problem of war. Here you get it all in one volume in a conceptual framework; with modern works, you must use many volumes to get the same scope of the problem and must also delve deeply into the technical aspects. In fact, though de Jomini's book was also a standard work at West Point and justifiably more famous than Halleck's work, Halleck covers all the bases whereas de Jomini likes to hover around strategy and tactics.
Gen. U.S. Grant and Halleck didn't get along very well -- Halleck (rising to General-in-chief) was the old-school type, the "grand marshall" of the US Army and he knew it. (You can tell by his portrait on Wikipedia!) He expected others to know it too. He was thorough, by the book, and slow to move on the offense. Grant, however, was one of the newer generation - he didn't much care for doing things "by the book" (he threw away Hardee's "Tactics" when he saw it was just common-sense maneuvering). And when he saw an opportunity to grab the enemy he was gung-ho for jumping on it before it dissolved away. (His brilliant and certainly unconventional Vicksburg campaign was a case of "it's easier to say I'm sorry than to ask permission!") Hence Grant felt sure that Halleck let some opportunities to attack the Rebs slip away for no good reason, and he felt that these incidents needlessly extended the war (see Grant's Memoirs). I mention this only to show that even in his day, Halleck's textbook approach to war was not always appreciated by newer commanders who were more resilient to the changing face of war in modern culture.
But there are basic aspects of war that never change from age to age -- strategy, the commander's mind and character, the need for tactics, the work of engineers, the vital aspect of logistics. And to someone who hasn't had any more exposure to the ideas of war than movies and picture books, Halleck's textbook is a welcome relief for the rational mind. It takes most of the mystique out of the subject, reduces it to manageable scientific principles, and trains the mind for a workable approach to dealing with battlefield realities. But Halleck also points out, as he should, there will always be that last 5% about the art of war that will depend on the character and creativitiy of the commander, which no textbook can train for. Not even his.
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