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 Poorly written, excrutiatingly detailed July 22, 2008
This book was really interesting at first, but I couldn't keep reading beyond a few hundred pages. The author keeps saying the same things over and over and over again (I got it, Charlie Wilson was tall and good looking, Gust was working class, etc.) He restates the same things so many times, it seems like he things readers are stupid and can't remember anything from prior chapters.
At first, I enjoyed learning about the inner workings of the CIA and the House of Representatives, etc. But this book is so tedious, I can't summon the attention span to finish reading it.
I almost always read a book before seeing the related movie because I like to read the more detailed story. In this case I am hoping the movie does a much better job of just telling the story without all of the extra noise and redundancy.
 I Don't Buy It July 14, 2008
1 out of 2 found this review helpful
The book gets 3 stars for its entertainment value and for a useful history of the extent of U.S. involvement in the Soviet-Afghanistan War. As for its essential thesis that "good guys" Charlie Wilson and Gust Avrokotos won the Cold War by bitch-slapping all the sissies running the American foreign policy establishment, that's a bunch of right wing pap.
Wilson is an out-of-control alcoholic Texas congressman who pushed for more funding of the Afghan rebels. Avrokotos is the foul-mouthed, street kid recruited by the CIA who does not quite fit in with its ivy-league culture. Of the two, Avrokotos is far more interesting and appealing.
The problem I have with this fable is its assumption that only Wilson and Avrokotos were savvy enough to see the strategic value of bleeding the Soviets in Afghanistan, thereby returning the favor of Vietnam. This wasn't exactly rocket science. The reluctance of policymakers to push too far too fast in Afghanistan made all the sense in the world, given that Afghanistan was on the border of the Soviet Union. Do you think we'd take kindly to Soviet arms shipments to rebels fighting our troops stationed in Grenada or Panama?
Also, apart from provoking World War III, the arms shipments raise the issue of the extent to which the Cold War is a military battle and the extent to which it is a political battle. The founding strategic father of the Cold War, George Kennan, complained that policymakers kept pushing to militarize the Cold War, whereas he viewed the containment policy as a sophisticated use of economic and political levers, with graduated military measures as a last resort.
Right wing zealots are quick to claim credit for victory in the Cold War because their crew happened to be in power when the Wall and the Kremlin fell. To some extent, whether in technology, science, literature, or politics, we all stand on the shoulders of the giants of the past. This is especially the case here. The Cold War was a bipartisan effort patiently fought over the course of a half-century, and the United States won because, as envisioned by Kennan in 1946, the Soviet Union collapsed under the weight of its own contradictions.
Indeed, the history of the Cold War is often the history of efforts by more sober leaders like Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Gorbachev, Brezhnev, and even Krushchev to tame the crazies who wanted to escalate the Cold War. Even Charlie Wilson and Avrokotos admit that the Reagan Administration & its allies were full of dangerous right-wing crazies (Humphrey, Ollie North, and I'd put CIA Director Casey in that category as well). Is Wilson really different from these clowns? Is he really the sober (what a word to describe Wilson) foil for a nut job like Senator Humphrey? The author wants you to believe that.
Of course, even Crile recognizes the "unintended consequence" of American aid in spurring on Islamic extremism. It's hard to give Wilson too many high-fives given what ended up happening in Afghanistan.
What should they have done? Well, given that the Soviet Union never did retaliate, it does appear that more and more military aid to the Afghan rebels was the right strategy. I question the huge volume sponsored by Wilson. Had there been no Wilson, would we have done nothing and sent the Afghans no military aid, and just caved? I seriously doubt it. The Afghan war would have been lost by the Soviets and we wouldn't have spent quite so much money or acted quite so provocatively and maybe we could have forged some better and longer lasting political alliances in this area. Don't you think it would have better for American foreign policy to have the aid perceived as coming from the President and tied to all sorts of quid pro quos -- as opposed as coming from a rogue Texas congressman? Doesn't allowing the Afghans and Pakistanis to say "Charlie did it" allow them at the same time to feel no obligation to Reagan or Bush?
And if what happened here was not complete Soviet withdrawal, but some sphere of influence for the Russians, would that have been the end of the world as we know it? No. Afghanistan itself did not have great importance; the fear was whether this was a stepping stone to the projection of Soviet power into the Middle East. That projection of Soviet power could have been fended off without absolute victory in Afghanistan. And, as we learned in Iraq, be careful of the absolute victory you wish for. In the end, the goal of foreign policy is not to rack up military victories but to create order and stability so that American interests can flourish.
So I don't particularly like the "John Wayne" approach of guys like Wilson. That approach has proven time and again to be stupid, self-indulgent, and self-destructive.
Personally, Wilson appears to be extraordinarily funny and charming. But the picture is a bit too charitable. It's hard to have much respect for him after the drunken hit and run episode and after all the out-of-control drinking. I feel a great deal of warmth for Avrokotos, who is truly funny and, despite his own demons and mean streak, is someone who comes off as more of a true patriot than Wilson.
It's a fun story that is fun to read. I just don't buy the attempt to lionize Wilson or the idiot element of the right wing he represents.
 Is it paranoia if they're really out to get you? July 12, 2008
Well, our government wasn't exactly out to get us, but it was hell-bent on conducting a covert war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. And it did. Charlie Wilson's War is the story of how the largest covert operation got haplessly underway and finished happily. Congressman Wilson from Lufkin, Texas, is the most unlikely of heroes and his CIA buddy is a counterculture misfit in a spy agency full of snobs recruited out of the Ivy League. When they team up with a rich socialite from Houston with "can do" connections here and in Pakistan, the game is on. The movie was amazing even if you're not a fan of the predictable casting of Tom Hanks and Julia Roberts. (You can watch it for Philip Seymour Hoffman; he's worth the price of admission.) But the book is even better with more details about what the heck was going on. The reader simply can't believe that a covert war, a successful one at that, was conducted under our very noses by medieval mujahideen warriors on horseback wielding ground-to-air missiles. You can't make this stuff up. Highly recommended.
Is this really how we operate? July 3, 2008
2 out of 2 found this review helpful
This book is a very personality-centered look at the U.S. response to the Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Don't expect to find any elucidation on the political turmoil in Afghanistan in the 70s' that may lend understanding to the Russian's actions; don't expect to find much consideration of the broad geopolitical thinking at the highest levels of the U.S. government and how the Afghanistan situation fit at the time. It seems scarcely possible that a relatively unimportant congressman could almost independently drive U.S. policy in an area with obvious risk implications for the U.S. Viewed from today's perspective, the ramifications of that knee-jerk reaction to Afghanistan in the 1980s has been quite severe.
Charlie Wilson, a gregarious sort and womanizer extraordinaire, was a populist U.S. Congressman from Texas, who was pro-military and fervently anti-Communist. He apparently fell under the spell of Houston socialite Joanne Herring, a member of various right-wing organizations, to address the plight of Afghan refugees and fighters. As a member of a House subcommittee responsible for funding covert operations, Wilson was able to repeatedly increase appropriations to fund the Afghan mujahideen in their resistance to the occupying Soviets. He later operated in concert with Gust Avrakotos, a crusty CIA agent with extensive knowledge of the Near East. Other key personalities were Mike Vickers, a CIA logistics expert and unheralded facilitator of the Afghan response, and Zia al Huq, the Pakistani dictator, who was concerned with being squeezed by the Russians and India and welcomed Charlie Wilson with open arms.
The book provides some insight into the conservative, containment thinking of the CIA. The CIA was conceived of as an elitist organization with definite protocols, where boat-rocking was frowned upon. Wilson and Avrakotos, a Greek ethnic, working-class Pennsylvanian and always an outsider at the CIA, challenged the CIA strategy of supplying the Afghans with antiquated rifles to simply be a thorn in the side of the Russians. The CIA leadership had to be dragged into accepting the arming of the mujahideen with rocket launchers to shoot down Soviet Hind helicopters, which ultimately resulted in the Soviet withdrawal.
It is disconcerting that the U.S. Congress seems to operate on the back-scratching principle, though the author was rather accepting of that mode of operation. Wilson was able to persuade others to increase funding by the judicious use of taxpayer-funded junkets and calling in stored IOUs. Though perhaps admirable from one perspective, Wilson was also able to navigate the tricky waters of involving both the Israelis and the Egyptians in possible arms sales to aid the Muslim Afghans, but he definitely was operating outside the bounds of U.S. policy if not legalities.
The book is long and repetitious with Wilson's every trip to Pakistan and elsewhere described in detail, not to mention his latest girlfriend who then simply disappears - what was the point? The author seems to rely greatly on the remembrances of Wilson and Avrakotos, including exact conversations of twenty years ago, many of which seem exaggerated and/or self-promoting. The book is not really satisfactory as biography, nor as broader commentary on U.S. foreign policies and operations, except in an inadvertent sense. Is this really how we operate? One would have expected greater condemnation from the author.
Comment on the movie: It captures the flavor of the book, but, due to time constraints, is very fragmentary. Without having read the book, most viewers would have to be utterly lost, as most actions and conversations have little or no context. Roberts and Hoffman are slightly miscast. Movie not recommended.
A Rendevous with the Devil (the devil is in the details) June 30, 2008
37 out of 72 found this review helpful
When Charlie Wilson first learned that the Afganistan soldiers, couragous fighters, were dying in large numbers and losing the war due to lack of an anti-aircraft gun which would shoot down the Hind helicopter, Charlie Wilson made it his goal and mission to supply these courageous warriors with such a weapon. The book does a superb job of detailing how this U.S. Senator became friends with powerful Israeli allies, Egyptian arms dealers, Pakestani President Zia al Huq who secretly helped the Afghanistan warriors, and with Gust Avrakotos, a C.I.A. agent with a checkered past. Wilson met Avratokos soon after he became the acting chief of the South Asia Operations Group, right about the time Wilson made it his mission to increase arms to the Afghani mujahideen. It was this partnership which sealed the deal to increase funds for the Afghanistan war and provide the weapons the warriors needed against the Soviet high tech helicopters and equipment. Gust Avratokos hired Mike Vickers, a low level C.I.A. agent, who demonstrated extraordinairy knowledge of Soviet weapons and also an uncanny precise ability to strategize military tactics, weapons, and guerilla maneuvers against them. Due to Vickers skills, Charlie Wilson's plans were becoming aligned with reality. George Crile does an amazing job of detailing how politics, human relations, world events and just plain luck can collide and melt creating the right outcome. This book helps the reader understand how very complex current world events really are, and that sometimes, the most astonishing interplay of unexpected elements can bring about success, despite the odds against them. The film "Charlie Wilson's War" is good and is recommended but it is highly selective in its contents and therefore superficial compared to the book.
This book is a fascinating document which describes an important event in United States history. Mostly because Charlie Wilson, a U.S. Congressman, became deeply involved in escalating C.I.A. covert operations in Afghanisian to influence the outcome of the war against the Soviets. It is something no other Congressman had ever done before and he achieved his goals beyond his wildest imagination! His persistent efforts and many political connections in the U.S. and world wide, made it possible for the Afghanistan mujahideen to turn the war around and win it, All this happened during the Iran-Contra hearings when *any* intervention by the United States, especially covert opeations, was looked upon with suspicion by elected officials. The C.I.A. dared not appear directly involved. They feared being called before the Intelligence Committee and having to reveal or defend their actions. Instead, they underhandedly provided Soviet weapons making it look like the mujahideen were using captured weapons or they supplied them with old World War I weapons and ammunition ... until Charlie Wilson got involved.
This Congressman dared to go where no Congressman had gone before! He got involved in areas typicaly reserved and controlled by the President of the United States. The President made decisions regarding foreign policy, specifically war, based on advice from the Director of the C.I.A., certain Intelligence Committees and the Pentagon. This Congressman nearly broke the law by stepping into territory which was defined as 'creating foreign policy' or worse yet, 'engaging in war', both areas totally controlled by the Executive branch of the goverment. The question begs to be asked, how plausible is it that a United States Congressman, a Texas socialite, and a renegade C.I.A. agent can ensure that a small nation receives the *right* weapon to win a war against a Super Power, the Soviet Union? Not plausible, very low probablilty, nearly impossible, it only happens in novels. Yet, as the saying goes, 'truth is stranger than fiction' and George Crile does an amazing job in piecing together how this *really* happened during tense political times. Also *most* highly recommended is the book Afghanistan: A Russian Soldier's Story written by Vlad Tamarov. He provides great insight and unique perspectives from his personal experience. Remember, the Russian soldiers were *not* volunteers but were conscripted to fight and die for a questionable objective. It is still unclear to me why the Soviet leaders initiated this war, what was there to gain from it? Erika Borsos [pepper flower]
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