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The End of the Old Order: Napoleon And Europe, 1801-1805 (Napoleon and Europe) | 
| Author: Frederick W. Kagan Publisher: Perseus Books Group Category: Book
List Price: $40.00 Buy New: $10.66 You Save: $29.34 (73%)
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Avg. Customer Rating: 6 reviews Sales Rank: 923796
Format: Bargain Price Media: Hardcover Number Of Items: 1 Pages: 774 Shipping Weight (lbs): 2.5 Dimensions (in): 9.1 x 6.4 x 1.9
Dewey Decimal Number: 940.27 ASIN: B000YT3KD6
Publication Date: August 30, 2006 Availability: Usually ships in 1-2 business days
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Product Description
Perhaps no person in history has dominated his or her own era as much as Napoleon. Despite his small physical stature, the shadow of Napoleon is cast like a colossus, compelling all who would look at that epoch to chart their course by reference to him. For this reason, most historical accounts of the Napoleonic era-and there are many-tell the same Napoleon-dominated story over and over again, or focus narrowly on special aspects of it. Frederick Kagan, distinguished historian and military policy expert, has tapped hitherto unused archival materials from Austria, Prussia, France, and Russia, to present the history of these years from the balanced perspective of all of the major players of Europe. In The End of the Old Order readers encounter the rulers, ministers, citizens, and subjects of Europe in all of their political and military activity-from the desk of the prime minister to the pen of the ambassador, from the map of the general to the rifle of the soldier. With clear and lively prose, Kagan guides the reader deftly through the intriguing and complex web of international politics and war. The End of the Old Order is the first volume in a new and comprehensive four-volume study of Napoleon and Europe. Each volume in the series will surprise readers with a dramatically different tapestry of early nineteenth-century personalities and events and will revise fundamentally our ages-old understanding of the wars that created modern Europe.
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| Customer Reviews: Read 1 more reviews...
Good customer service February 9, 2008 0 out of 2 found this review helpful
The book took longer to arrive than the 5 - 14 business days, but the company checked up frequently on the status on my order through email. When the order became overdue, they offered to send another book or refund the purchase price. I appreciate the customer service and when the book finally did arrive, it did so in perfect condition. I would definitely order from them again.
Simply Amazing December 14, 2006 5 out of 13 found this review helpful
This book is an excellent start to a four part series (other three are unpublished at this time) that delivers pure diplomatic history. This is expert analysis of how the diplomatic machine of Europe brought about an end to stability and peace with the collapse of the old order. Napoleon's designs on Europe are clearly seen and this book takes you through Austerlitz and the start of the Napoleonic Empire. Although Napoleon declares himself Empire it is not truly established until Austerlitz leaving him in control of much of Europe. This book written in fantastic prose clearly outlines how Europe got to that stage. This is a must have for any Napoleonic library and I eagerly await the continuation of this series. Easily five stars and deserves more.
the end of the old order: Napoleon and Europe November 10, 2006 2 out of 14 found this review helpful
I love this book very well written only took me 2 days to read it .
Diplomacy and War like Chess October 13, 2006 12 out of 17 found this review helpful
In this volume(and the 3 that will follow) Kagan sets out to write a military/diplomatic history of the Napoleonic period.The first 200 pages give an overview of how the war of the First Coalition came about. Then there are some 100 pages devoted to the french and allied war plans and the rest of the book covers the war itself.This is a work of explanation and interpretation and the focus is on the diplomats and generals who made the important decisions.There is no spotlight on the idiosyncracies of individuals perse ,but only if it is important to explain some decision taken by that person. Likewise the descriptions of battles are explanatory. There is no blood and guts. All in all it is a bit like a game of chess and the best explanatory book i have read about Napoleonic Europe. The author, in contrast to most other books about this time, devotes an equal amount of space to the French and the Allies and is evenhanded in the condemnation or praise he bestows on the belligerents.It is simply not true as an other reviewer has it that this is the old Napoleon as Ogre story all over again.Knowing the author's very rightleaning political views i indeed started reading this book with some trepidation, but was pleasantly suprised that Kagan did'nt let those views cloud his judgement.Repeatedly Kagan stresses that it was'nt Napoleon who wanted this war but Tsar Alexander. Of course you can take exception with the author's interpretation of motives and events but that applies to every thesis. At least Kagan does't parrot every other author and his analysis is based on thorough archival investigation. This is not a book for the novice but if you want to know the ins and outs of Napoleonic Europe, have an analytical bend and value clear and uncluttered prose this is the book for you. Highly recommended. Hats of for Frederick Kagan and counting down to the next volume.
The Myth of the Corsican Ogre... October 5, 2006 71 out of 95 found this review helpful
This volume, while interesting in places, is neither brilliant nor monumental, except for its length.
What the author does do, however, is raise once again the old anti-Napoleonic propaganda from the period referring to Napoleon as a criminal, megalomaniac, tyrant, and generally repeating well-worn material of the old 'Corsican Ogre' school of thought. At the same time a completely inaccurate picture of Tsar Alexander is presented giving the patricidal monarch much more credit than he is due. This completely ignores accurate scholarship on Napoleon that has been completed since 1970.
Looking at the bibliography, it is evident what the inaccurate portrayal of Napoleon is based on. The only modern biography of Napoleon listed in the execrable volume by Alan Schom, which is fit only for a doorstop. None of the credible biogrpahies of Napoleon are referenced, such as the work of Englund, Cronin, or Ludwig. This is a shame, because presenting Napoleon inaccurately as a man and a head of state, colors the entire volume and makes it an unreliable resource.
The characterization of Napoleon in this volume is as inaccurate as the comparison presented on the organization of the Grande Armee and the allied armies. From 1800 onwards the corps d'armee was a permanent organization in the French service. That was not so with the allied armies, and equating the two systems in 1805 is incorrect. The allies lagged behind in tactics, organization, and staff organization and functioning in 1805 and didn't seriously start to reform until after the 1807 campaign.
The first danger signal in this volume is the overuse of the term 'myth.' What is evident in the volume is that a strawman has been created in order to make a point, which isn't in France's or Napoleon's favor. And the point(s) made is/are incorrect to a large degree. Much of the work in the volume on the diplomatic/political maneuverings from 1801-1805 is very good, but the military aspect is poor. Frankly, the author contradicts himself often regarding Napoleon's performance and motives.
What is entirely neglected that it wasn't merely France and Napoleon that were aggressive empires, but the same holds true for Great Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia. Looking at the results of the Congress of Vienna in 1814-1815 is a very good example. While Tsar Alexander is painted as a monarch who was working for the peace of Europe, what is neglected is that he waged wars against Turkey and in the Baltic during the period that were anything but peaceful and defensive. And while excuses are given for Alexander regarding the murder of his father, Napoleon is taken to task for the trial and execution of the Duc d'Enghien and what is neglected completely is the assassination attempt against Napoleon early in the Consulate when the bomb just missed destroying his carriage on the way to the opera in December 1800. That was at least financed by the British and was openly supported by the Bourbons. Finally the influence that British merchants might have had in the assassination of Tsar Paul, Alexander's father isn't mentioned.
In the book's introduction the author has stated that seven years were devoted to the research and writing of this volume. It was not time well-spent.
In short, this volume is a disappointment and in this reviewer's opinion does not add to the literature of the period. The analogies used regarding World War II and recent US operations in the Middle East to not enhance the volume and apparently the author doesn't understand either Napoleon's command system or the purpose and operation of the corps d'armee system implemented by Napoleon in 1800.
This volume is a great opportunity missed and this book is not recommended as a source. Frederick Schneid's Napoleon's Conquest of Europe: The War of the Third Coalition is a much better work, concise, accurate, and better written.
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