Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (PSI Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era) | 
| Author: David Galula
Publisher: Praeger Security International Paperback
Category: Book
List Price: $29.95
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Avg. Customer Rating:  12 reviews
Sales Rank: 40016
Media: Paperback
Number Of Items: 1
Pages: 128
Shipping Weight (lbs): 0.4
Dimensions (in): 9 x 6 x 0.5
ISBN: 0275993035
Dewey Decimal Number: 355
EAN: 9780275993030
ASIN: 0275993035
Publication Date: August 30, 2006
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Product Description
Inspired by his experiences as a French military officer and attache in China, Greece, Southeast Asia, and Algeria, the author realized the "need for a compass" in the suppression of insurgency, and he set out to "define the laws of counterinsurgency warfare, to deduce from them its principles, and to outline the corresponding strategy and tactics." His book provides an analysis of how to countermine insurgency and the elements that might hinder its defeat. Written in 1964, the book in its new printing is as relevant now as it was 40 years ago-providing a template for the defeat of today's insurgents and terrorists.
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| Customer Reviews: Read 7 more reviews...
 Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (PSI Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era) May 22, 2008
This Was a very good book which should have been writen before the Vietnam War. Ir was needed badley.
Solid Foundation April 7, 2008
If you are looking for a book to serve as a foundation of knowledge on counterinsurgency warfare, this is it. It provides what is essentially an executive summary of two major types of insurgencies. The author is very knowledgeable and "down-to-earth." I have spent two years in Iraq and wish that I had read this book prior to 2003. I have recommended it to all of my friends and peers who have involvement with Soldiers, NCOs, Officers, or cadets.
 book review December 25, 2007
A classic.
I sent mine to Iraq. I wish all the Marines would read it.
And better yet, all the commanders.
Essential October 21, 2007
3 out of 3 found this review helpful
This book should be on the required reading for any of the military that are in/going to Iraq and Afghanistan. Page 4 states the obvous, that only took us four years in Iraq to learn...the objective (center of gravity) is the population. The new counterinsugency manual borrows heavily from this book. Since "irregular warfare" is the new buzz in the military, the rank and file should read this to understand that you can not kill your way to victory and the indirect approach is the way to go. Quiet professionals have been saying this all along...
Excellent, with one caveat September 4, 2007
4 out of 4 found this review helpful
I will not repeat the good things said in previous reviews on this work, as they cover it well, and the credentials of the previous reviewers in several instances should also speak for themselves.
Galula's book is a very good effort for trying to look at the lessons of counterinsurgency objectively. In reading reviews and other materials on the book, as well as talking to people about it, I fear, however, that Galula's work is often taken out of its historical context, which is dangerous. Galula's essay, like Roger Trinquier's "Modern Warfare," need to be seen in the context of the French guerre revolutionnaire, developed first in Indochina between 1945-1954 (French defense journals at the time are replete with the writings of officers developing the school of guerre revolutionnaire), and carried over to Algeria between 1954-1962. The guerre revolutionnaire school argued that counterinsurgents needed to not just understand the insurgents, but fight a counterinsurgency using the tactics and strategy of insurgency. The intellectual starting point was Mao. The guerre revolutionnaire school and its intellectual heritage in the French Army goes a long way toward explaining many of the excesses and brutal tactics used in Algeria. The four generals who tried to overthrow de Gaulle in April 1961 were some of the guerre revolutionnaire's most vocal disciples.
Thus, while Galula's book is invaluable, I fear it being taken out of context of the guerre revolutionnaire school of thought in the French army during the 1950s. There is unfortunately very little on it in English as well, which is part of the problem. For anyone wishing to use Galula's precepts in counterinsurgency or to understand the nature of counterinsurgency, please make sure you learn more about the French military in Indochina and Algeria and the context from which Galula formed his ideas of counterinsurgency.
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