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Truman and the Hiroshima Cult (Rhetoric and Public Affairs Series) | 
| Author: Robert P. Newman
Publisher: Michigan State University Press
Category: Book
List Price: $38.95
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Avg. Customer Rating:  4 reviews
Sales Rank: 1312315
Media: Hardcover
Number Of Items: 1
Pages: 292
Shipping Weight (lbs): 1.2
Dimensions (in): 9.3 x 6.3 x 0.9
ISBN: 0870134035
Dewey Decimal Number: 940.5425
EAN: 9780870134036
ASIN: 0870134035
Publication Date: August 1995
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| Customer Reviews:
 EXCELLENT!!! March 29, 2006
2 out of 4 found this review helpful
This book is a must-read for anyone who wants to learn of TRUTH regarding the bomb. Newman does and excellent job of very clearly explaining the FACTS on this very complicated & controversial chapter of history.
I'd like to quote one of the other reviewers of this book: "Part of the answer is no doubt domestic American politics. Having maneuvered the Japanese into the "sneak attack" against Pearl Harbor and having churned out viciously racist propaganda portraying the Japanese as a subhuman demon breed, the American government could hardly turn around and admit that the whole affair had merely been a sordid struggle over the boundaries of imperial spheres of influence."
What and incredible load of garbage to imply that the U.S. "maneuvered" the Japanese into attacking Pearl Harbor. I'm speechless. Obviously, David Miller is a clouded revisionist and you can't take his review seriously.
 Yes, the atomic bombings were "necessary" September 5, 2004
14 out of 32 found this review helpful
Robert Newman's argument is quite simple. First, the nuclear obliteration of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was necessary to bring about the immediate and full surrender of the Japanese government. Second, it was therefore morally justified.
Newman makes a plausible case that the surrender terms publicly demanded by the American government could only be achieved by the atomic bombings. (American demands were summed up by American officials in the shibboleth "unconditional surrender.") Newman concedes that "the Japanese air force and navy were in tatters" and that the emperor and a number of civilian government leaders were desperate to end the war. But, Newman argues, the bitter-enders in the Japanese military who controlled the government were unwilling to accept America's surrender terms. And, the courage and tenacity of Japanese soldiers, as exhibited in the battle for Okinawa, meant that a final ground assault on the home islands would be devastatingly bloody.
But, even if the nuclear obliteration of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were necessary to bring about "unconditional" Japanese surrender, does this mean that that the bombings were morally justified?
A fundamental principle of morality is that even noble goals do not justify evil means. Intentional targeting of civilian populations is a violation of the laws of war -- whether or not it advances the goals of the war. This was recognized by civilized countries, prior to the Second World War. As Newman himself acknowledges, "The Fourth Hague Convention (1907), which was adopted by most Western nations, forbids any bombardment of undefended towns..." Accordingly, as Newman goes on to explain, "At the beginning of World War II, both Churchill and Roosevelt endorsed the principle of noncombatant immunity, and for a while Allied bombers attempted precision bombing of military and industrial targets" as required by international law. But, after a while, this became inconvenient, so the Allies forgot about the laws of civilized warfare and started purposefully targeting civilians.
The atomic bombings were merely the final acts of barbarism on the part of the Allies.
But, in evaluating the justice of the bombings, one should go beyond abstract principles of international morality and look at the concrete motives and causes of the war.
Japan went to war because it correctly felt that the United States was creating an economic stranglehold to prevent Japan from carrying out an imperialist policy modeled on the policies of the United States itself (e.g., in the Philippines: see Stuart Creighton Miller's "Benevolent Assimilation") and of America's imperialist allies, such as Britain, France, and the Netherlands. Indeed, prior to Pearl Harbor, the United States had committed itself to going to war against Japan if Japan moved against British or Dutch possessions in Asia, even if Japan did not attack US forces (the so-called ABD agreement).
The Japanese imperialists were, of course, guilty of serious, brutal atrocities, but so also were British imperialists, Belgian imperialists, etc.
As Newman puts it, "Japan was merely following their [the Western powers'] example, but then the Western powers wanted to change the rules. Western leaders did indeed want to change the rules."
Indeed.
The ultimate cause of the nuclear incineration of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was the decision by the American Administration, before Pearl Harbor, that non-Caucasians, such as the Japanese, must not be allowed to play the imperialist game which the Caucasian powers themselves had so greatly enjoyed.
Was then the murder of the inhabitants of Hiroshima and Nagasaki solely due to racism?
That raises other key questions. Why, even given America's goal of limiting Japanese imperialist expansion, was Japanese "unconditional" surrender actually necessary in 1945? Why was not a negotiated peace possible which would curtail Japanese imperial reach without an actual occupation and "unconditional" surrender of Japan? Japan was already reeling militarily; the United States had already succeeded in its pre-war goal of cutting off Japanese access to strategic vital resources.
Newman himself lays out four conditions which he claims would have made surrender readily acceptable even to the bitter-enders in the Japanese military: "no change in the government, no occupation of the home islands, Japanese troops to disarm themselves, and Japan to conduct any war crimes trials."
Why not? Numerous wars throughout history have been ended on similar terms.
Part of the answer is no doubt domestic American politics. Having maneuvered the Japanese into the "sneak attack" against Pearl Harbor and having churned out viciously racist propaganda portraying the Japanese as a subhuman demon breed, the American government could hardly turn around and admit that the whole affair had merely been a sordid struggle over the boundaries of imperial spheres of influence.
More broadly, from a world perspective, the twentieth century was the story of the rise of the United States of America from being an insignificant player on the world stage to being the sole world hegemon.
America has come to view itself as the redeemer nation, the secular Messiah that will bring the Millennium to all mankind, the "first universal nation," to use the grandiose phrase favored by some neoconservatives.
To work out a negotiated peace with the Japanese on the basis of sordid concerns of conflicting national interests would have sullied America's self-image as the shining Savior of Mankind. In an act of grotesque religious blasphemy, the United States has taken upon itself the role of Jesus Christ.
So, yes, the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was necessary. It was necessary to advance the American messianic mission, necessary to advance the untrammeled world-wide power of America's ruling elites, and necessary to create a world empire through which the permissive, materialist, amoral values of the United States can be forcibly imposed on the entire Earth.
And, someday, I fear, by the same impeccable logic the rest of the human race will conclude that the nuclear incineration of a half-dozen American cities is "necessary" to free the human race from the American imperium.
As Thomas Jefferson once said, "I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just."
Thank You Robert P. Newman July 16, 2003
12 out of 16 found this review helpful
What a debt of gratitude we owe to this author for so powerfully slamming the arguments of the so-called revisionists, who hold that the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki had no military value whatsoever and only served to show the Soviets how powerful we were, an argument so laughable as to require a refutation as strong as our counterattack on the Japs themselves after Pearl Harbor. Point by point, the assertions made by the revisionists are destroyed. The battle of Okinawa, which took place only a few weeks before the bombings, with it's massive U.S. casualties, kamikaze attacks and widespread suicides by civilians is discussed. This is an episode either ignored or downplayed in most revisionist writings, and obviously constitutes a gaping hole in their arguments. The peace feelers sent out by the Japanese, which are usually inflated and put on the same level as a waving white flag, are shown to be half-hearted attempts by largely impotent civilian leaders to negotiate favorable terms that were thoroughly opposed by the military who fully controlled the country. Japanese plans to repel the planned U.S.invasion are documented in detail, and will give pause to those who believe the Japanese were incapable of waging war effectively by this time. Many other revisionist claims are shown to be weak at best and downright humorous at worst. Some information given here is not so well known. For example, the widespread war weariness among allied troops was starting to show signs of developing into mutiny, thereby giving Truman another incentive to end the war fast. This was new to me. First hand accounts of Japanese leaders about their view of the Potsdam Declaration show that it was hardly seen as a death sentence for their emperor. Perhaps the most fascinating chapter deals with the doctrine of unconditional surrender and the reasons why this policy was in force. The Monday morning quarterbacks who second guess Truman's decision see this policy as nothing but an impediment to peace and have zero understanding of it's value. Another widely cited piece of evidence is a report by the U.S. military that the Japanese would have surrendered without the bomb. This report is completely discredited by Newman, who actually finds evidence of the opposite conclusion within the research done by this "survey". All in all this book is an excellent refutation of a well publicized ideological campaign that masquerades as history. The only thing missing is that in the explanation of why this school of thought arose, not much is said about the shock the world felt at the use of atomic weapons. It's easy to understand why many would have second thoughts about such a horrible tool of destruction and why no sane person would ever want to see it used again. I think this is at least one motivation behind the attempts to show how it's use could have been avoided. But a distortion is still a distortion, and Newman does a decisive job of blasting this one out of the water.
essential a-bomb history December 8, 2001
15 out of 20 found this review helpful
Wow. Newman sets out to (and overwhelmingly succeeds) to obliterate any and all arguments of those who claim the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki unjustified and/or not needed. He does this by exploring not only the myths perpetuated by these "cultists" (the word he uses to describe people who endorse the above), but also how and why these myths began. These people believe the bombing was primarily motivated by something other than military reasons and fall into one of six categories, namely those who think primary motivation was: (1)intimidation of the Soviet Union (2)racism (3)desire of scientists to experiment with a new toy (4)fear of investigation by Congress of those in charge of the A-bomb project if the expenditure found not useful (5)sheer bureaucratic momentum (6)any combination of the above. The book is essentially a debate; an appeal to actual history vs. convolution and misrepresentation of facts by some very formidable-sounding opponents. Some include U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (the impetus behind most of those who endorse any of the above), Gar Alporovitz, P.M.S. Blackett among most any others of note. The sheer volume of impeccable research would suffice for a great argument, but the way Newman delves into the sources behind the sources and their context coupled with the flawless logic he employs is simply stunning - its a virtual lesson in debate as well as vital history. Knowing from outset his intention (to argue) I consciously tried to poke holes in his discussion and failed miserably (since I was familiar with Gar Alporovitz's opus 'The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb'as well as a fair amount of WWII history, I thought I was reasonably prepared - wrong!) Even though Newman's discussion is rational, logical, and non-vindictive or inflammatory, he effectively skewers his opponents. However, he still remains balanced in his position as his discussion of the AEC and post-war events shows. Highlights include his discussion of post-war events that influenced the American 'cultists' genesis and perpetuation as well as a total of deaths attributable to the Japanese from 1931-45. I truly wish that I could point to a major flaw but I simply cannot. The book is not archival but isn't intended to be. Newman's position in a nutshell: The decision to use the bomb was motivated primarily by ending the war as quickly as possible while saving as many lives as possible. If somebody wants to argue with him, good luck. Outstanding book.
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